Holders of JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s debt and equity securities will absorb losses if it were to enter into a resolution.
Federal Reserve rules require that JPMorgan Chase & Co. (the “Parent Company”) maintain minimum levels of unsecured external long-term debt and other loss-absorbing capacity with specific terms (“eligible LTD”) for purposes of recapitalizing JPMorgan Chase’s operating subsidiaries if the Parent Company were to enter into a resolution either:
- in a bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, or
- in a receivership administered by the FDIC under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Title II”).
If the Parent Company were to enter into a resolution, holders of eligible LTD and other debt and equity securities of the Parent Company will absorb the losses of the Parent Company and its subsidiaries.
The preferred “single point of entry” strategy under JPMorgan Chase’s resolution plan contemplates that only the Parent Company would enter bankruptcy proceedings. JPMorgan Chase’s subsidiaries would be recapitalized, as needed, so that they could continue normal operations or subsequently be divested or wound down in an orderly manner. As a result, the Parent Company’s losses and any losses incurred by its subsidiaries would be imposed first on holders of the Parent Company’s equity securities and thereafter on its unsecured creditors, including holders of eligible LTD and other debt securities. Claims of holders of those securities would have a junior position to the claims of creditors of JPMorgan Chase’s subsidiaries and to the claims of priority (as determined by statute) and secured creditors of the Parent Company.
Accordingly, in a resolution of the Parent Company in bankruptcy, holders of eligible LTD and other debt securities of the Parent Company would realize value only to the extent available to the Parent Company as a shareholder of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and its other subsidiaries, and only after any claims of priority and secured creditors of the Parent Company have been fully repaid.
The FDIC has similarly indicated that a single point of entry recapitalization model would be its expected strategy to resolve a systemically important financial institution, such as the Parent Company, under Title II. However, the FDIC has not formally adopted or committed to any specific resolution strategy.
If the Parent Company were to approach, or enter into, a resolution, none of the Parent Company, the Federal Reserve or the FDIC is obligated to follow JPMorgan Chase’s preferred resolution strategy, and losses to holders of eligible LTD and other debt and equity securities of the Parent Company, under whatever strategy is ultimately followed, could be greater than they might have been under JPMorgan Chase’s preferred strategy.
