No actor shapes the Middle East’s security environment for the worse more than Iran—its malign behavior is the organizing principle defining alliances, rivalries, and threat perceptions. After a series of bold, high-risk Israeli military actions last year, Tehran now finds itself at its weakest point since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Its “axis of resistance”—including Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Iranian-aligned militant groups—is reeling. Deterrence has been undermined and air defenses shattered after two failed missile attacks on Israel. New leadership in Syria and Lebanon seem intent on resisting its influence. Russia, once a reliable backer, is focused on Ukraine. At home, the regime faces deepening unrest, a spiraling economy, an energy crisis, and a looming leadership transition. And yet, Iran still holds a powerful card: its nuclear program.
The diplomatic window is cracked open, but likely not for long. Iran’s leadership, fully aware of their exposed position (and working to overcome it), may feel pressure to negotiate—especially with President Trump stating his preference for a deal over “doing the obvious,” while visibly ramping up U.S. military presence into the region. But Iran won’t accept just any deal; demands for zero enrichment that resemble Israel’s preferred “Libya solution” will be rejected. More doable is something that looks like the Obama-era “JCPOA,” perhaps without the detested sunset clauses. Such an agreement would be enough for the Administration to declare victory and move on – as some Administration officials are hinting they are ready to do.
The looming October 18, 2025, expiration of UN sanctions relief adds more urgency. If Iran is still pursuing a bomb by late summer or fall, the UK, France, and Germany are expected to allow for the “snapback” of UN sanctions that include an arms embargo, targeted global asset freezes, travel bans on Iranian leadership, a ban on uranium enrichment and reprocessing, a ban on ballistic missile technology, and authorization for cargo inspections. In response, Iranian officials have said they would consider leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which would remove virtually all nuclear inspection mechanisms. This tit-for-tat would be lose-lose for all sides. Sanctions relief, on the other hand, as part of any deal would lift Iran’s economy, re-open the country’s access to markets and trade, and allow it to re-capture some market share within the energy sector. One of the hardest issues to reconcile is how to prevent Tehran from using any sanctions relief to refuel its war machine (as happened a decade ago with the JCPOA).
Despite the incentives pushing toward a deal—including, importantly, the Gulf states’ shift toward reproachment over confrontation in service of transforming their economies—miscalculation remains a serious risk. Communication channels are shaky and mutual distrust runs deep. Israel, possibly backed by Iran hawks in the U.S. pushing for “maximum pressure” or “escalate to deescalate,” now sees this as the perfect moment to strike. Iran might double down and sprint for a bomb. Either side could misread the other’s intentions. Escalation, whether by design or mistake, could come fast—and spiral into a wider regional war.